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Government Investment Programs

that reaches back to the nineteenth-century French libertarian socialist PierreJoseph Proudhon (see Dillard, 1942b; Darity, 1995). Both Gesell and Keynes
opposed nationali zation of industry and central planning (although Gesell did
advocate nationalization of land in conj unction with stamped currency to
prevent a flight to land as an alternative to a flight to money). Both were
dissatisfied with capitalism on grounds of maldistribution of income and the
waste of unemployment, and both rejected 'communism' as an alternative on
grounds of destruction of individual liberties; Gesell and Key nes were champions of the 'middle way'. Both sought to reconcile individualism with the
need for state action to maintain economic prosperity. And both saw the
extension of prosperity - rather than social revolution - as the best avenue
towards the end of capitalism and its attendant social ills.
WILLI AM D ARITY, JR.

See also:
Liquidity Trap; Monetary Policy; Money ; Real Balance Effect.
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Government Investment Programs (the Socialization of
Investment)
In the last chapter of The GeneraL Th eory Key nes said that the 'outstanding
fault of the economic society in which we li ve are its failure to provide for
full employment and its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth and
incomes' (Keynes, 1936, p. 372). These problems were linked by the classical theory of the rate of interest that justified high interest rates as needed to
generate savings for investment: high interest rates contributed to significant
inequalities in fortunes accumulated by the rentier class and reduced investment below full employment levels. However, were interest rates low, it
would be possible 'to increase the stock of capital up to a point where its
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marginal efficiency had fallen to a very low figure' , so that 'capital instruments would cost almost nothing' (ibid., p. 375). Depriving capital of its
scarcity value 'would mean the euthanasia of the rentier' or 'functionless
investor' (ibid.) and would also imply a responsibility for the state to formulate policy regarding what inducements to investment and influence upon the
propensity to consume were necessary to achieve a rate of accumulation
sufficient for full employment. Keynes adds,
it seems unlikely that the influence of banking policy on the rate of interest will be
sufficient by itself to determine the optimum rate of investment. I conceive,
therefore, that a somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment will prove
the only means of securing an approximation to full employment. (Ibid., p. 378).
This involved neither 'state socialism' nor state ownership of the means of
production. Indeed , 'apart from the necessity of central controls to bring
about an adjustment between the propensity to consume and the inducement
to invest, there is no more reason to socialise economic life than there was
before' (ibid., p . 379) - efficiency, freedom and private initiative being the
likely casualties of attempting to do so.
Keynes's long-term economic policy thus focused on the state 'taking an
ever greater responsibility for directly organising investment' (ibid., p. 164).
In his wartime Treasury memoranda of 1943-4 concerning postwar economic
adjustment he was more specific about the extent of this responsibility :
If two-thirds or three-quarters of total investment is carried out or can be influenced by public or semi-public bodies, a long-term programme of a stable character
should be capable of reducing the potential range of fluctuation to much narrower
limits than formerly, when a smaller volume of investment was under public
control and when even this part tended to follow, rather than correct, fluctuations
of investment in the strictly private sector of the economy. (1973-89, XXVII,
p.322)
Thus Keynes allowed that the state could carry out programs of public investment itself, and/or encourage such programs being developed by organizations
independent of the state but which still pos.sessed some public character.
There are two ways in which he apparently understood the latter, both deriving from views Keynes expressed much earlier in 'The End of Laissez-Faire'
(1926).
On the one hand, Keynes emphasized the importance of a variety of 'semiautonomous bodies within the state':
I believe that in many cases the ideal size for the unit of control and organisation
lies somewhere between the individual and modern state. I suggest, therefore, that
progress lies in the growth and recognition of semi-autonomous bodies within the
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State - bodies whose criterion of action within their own field is solely the public
good as they understand it, and from whose deliberations motives of private
advantage are excluded. (1973-89, IX, p. 288).
As examples Keynes cited 'the universities, the Bank of England, the Port of
London Authority, even perhaps the railways companies ' , and suggested that
these institutions were rooted in an ancient English tradition that regarded
such bodies as 'a mode of government' (ibid., p. 289). On this view, then,
' semi-public bodies' were public-spirited in concerning themselves with the
public good (rather than shareholder interests), but still not part of the state
proper. They might be thought part of an extended state, as compared to the
nuclear state made up of Parliament, the Cabinet, the civil service and the
judiciary (Jensen, 1994).
On the other hand, Keynes also though that 'joint stock institutions' , which
had traditionally made shareholder interests primary.-tended to undergo an
evolution in nature when they increased in size over time:
when they have reached a certain age and size, [they 1approximate to the status of
public corporations rather than that of individualistic enterprise. One of the most
interesting and unnoticed developments of recent decades has been the tendency
of big enterprise to socialise itself. A point arrives in the growth of a big institution ... at which the owners of the capital, i.e. the shareholders, are almost entirely
dissociated from the management, with the result that the direct personal interest
of the latter in the making of great profit becomes quite secondary. When this
stage is reached, the general stability and reputation of the institution are more
considered by the management than the maximum of profit for the shareholders.
(Keynes , 1973-89,IX, p. 289)
While such 'joint stock institutions' would still typically be involved in forms
of production less public in character than that carried out by Keynes 's ' semiautonomous bodies within the [extended) State', the separation of management
and ownership allowed for greater retained earnings and thus potentially
higher levels of investment. The state might then well anticipate some success in designing inducements to investment for organizations of this sort, as
compared to the more traditional owner-managed firms that predominated in
the nineteenth century.
Given these different strategies for carrying out and/or influencing investment, a further issue for Keynes was how the state might coordinate and
guide investment across its own agencies, the ' semi-autonomous bodies with
the [extended) State' and manager-operated 'joint stock institutions' . In 1939,
he wrote that 'we need, if we are to enjoy prosperity and profits, .. . much
more central planning than we have at present' (1973-89, XXI, p. 492) and
recommended creating a National Investment Board to assist in this purpose.
Keynes, however, did not indicate clearly what proportions of public invest-
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ment, semi-public investment and private investment he thought might be
desirable. Presumably the point of having a National Investment Board was
to determine what these shares ought to be on the basis of economic conditions.
An important philosophical theme in Keynes's thinking on these matters
concerns the ethical goals underlying policy recommendation. Keynes was
critical of utilitarian thinking from the time when he studied G.E. Moore's
ethics as an undergraduate, and in a number of his early Apostles papers he
discussed the ethical conflict between the goals of being good and doing
good. In his post-General Theory 'My Early Beliefs ' memoir, however, he
defended rules and conventions - 'the extraordinary accomplishment of our
predecessors in the ordering of life' (1973-89, X, p. 448) - as normatively
valuable, because they helped individuals reconcile being good and doing
good. Rules and conventions, moreover, were embodied in institutions in
Keynes's view, and long-term economic policy could not but be concerned
with the development of institutions (Davis, 1994). Thus we may infer that
Keynes supported a socialization of investment, not just because he thought it
would lead to higher levels of employment and reduce inequitable distributions of income and wealth, but also because he expected it would enable
individuals increasingly to reconcile the twin moral requirements of being
good and doing good. This theme is most prominent in his references to
pUblic-spiritedness in the 'semi-autonomous bodies within the [extended)
State' and to the socializing of big enterprise. Essentially Keynes sought a
closer blending of private and public purpose - a closer connection between
being good and doing good, which should also be thought part and parcel of
Keynes's liberal vision. Neither a state-commanded economy nor one driven
by narrow self-interest was healthy either economically or ethically.
The socialization of investment summarized for Keynes a range of longterm policies meant to improve the functioning of the economy and raise the
well-being of individuals in society generally. A first step involved the
'euthanasia of the rentier', and thus a shift in the balance of class power. A
second step involved programs to enhance investment, including public investment, inducements for private investment . and institutional change that
would have an impact on investment decision-making practices. A third step
involved embracing a new moral vision meant to overcome old dualisms
produced by the historic shift from entrepreneurship to speculation. cknerally these strategies and their rationales have been overlooked by economists
since Keynes, who have restricted their understanding of his policy thinking
to short-term policy issues. Keynes likely thought short-term policy operated
within a long-term policy framework, and thus himself evaluated short-term
proposals from this broader perspective.
JOHN B. DAVIS
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See also:
Economics of Keynes and of his Revolution, Key Elements of the; Keynes, John Maynard ;
Keynes and Probability; Keynes, The Influence or Burke and Moore on.
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